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THE MEAD DOCTRINE: OF RULES AND STANDARDS,
META-RULES AND META-STANDARDS
Thomas W. Merrill*
United States v. Mead Corp.1 is the Supreme Court’s most important pronouncement to date
about the scope of the Chevron doctrine.2 According to Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissenting opinion,
Mead is “one of the most significant opinions ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial
review of administrative action.”3 Justice Scalia also thought that the consequences of “the Mead
doctrine,” as he called it, “will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad.”4
Justice Scalia’s indictment of Mead was driven by his attachment to rules and dislike of
standards.5 He saw Mead as shifting the practice of deference away from the more rule-like Chevron
toward the more standard-like doctrine associated with Skidmore v. Swift & Co.6 As he noted
sarcastically: “The Court has largely replaced Chevron … with that test most beloved by a court
unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect): th’ol’
‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”7 Justice Scalia urged, instead, that Chevron be declared the sole
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121 S.Ct. 2164 (2001).
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So named of course for Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2189 (dissenting opinion).

4

Id. at 2178, 2189.

5

See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, passim (1989).

6

323 U.S. 134 (1944).

7

Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2178 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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measure of judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes, with Skidmore relegated to the
dustbin of history as an “anachronism.”8
The majority responded with an air of patient resignation. “Justice SCALIA’s first priority over
the years has been to limit and simplify,” Justice Souter observed in his opinion for the Court, whereas
others would “tailor deference to variety.”9 Justice Souter could afford to take a detached attitude
toward Justice Scalia’s fulminations.

In his campaign to award the field to Chevron as the sole

survivor in a battle against Skidmore, Justice Scalia failed to attract a single additional vote.10
But the choice between rules and standards was present in Mead not only at what might be called
the primary decisional level – the level where courts decide whether to accept any particular agency’s
interpretation of a statute. The same choice is also implicated at the meta-level where the court must
decide which legal doctrine to use (Chevron or Skidmore) in determining whether to accept the agency
interpretation. Assuming – as eight Justices evidently do – that we have two deference doctrines, the
more rule-like Chevron and the more standard-like Skidmore, how do we determine where Chevron
stops and Skidmore starts within the system of judicial review? Do we police this boundary by means of
a meta-rule or a meta-standard?
As to this higher-order issue, there was no meaningful debate between Justice Souter and Justice
Scalia. Justice Souter began his opinion by announcing what appeared to be a two-part rule: “We hold
that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise that

8

Id. at 2183.

9

Id. at 2176.
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authority.”11 By the time Justice Souter had finished his analysis, however, the inquiry had collapsed
into a formless consideration of “factors” of unspecified weight. That is to say, the majority ended up
with a meta-standard. Justice Scalia, for his part, also started with what appeared to be meta-rule:
Chevron should apply to any interpretation “by the administering agency that is authoritative – that
represents the official position of the agency.”12 But on closer examination this too turned out to be a
multi-factoral standard, albeit one that Justice Scalia insisted was more “bright-line” than the standard
employed by the majority.13
I argue in this commentary that both the majority and the dissent were mistaken in seeking to
define the domain of Chevron with anything other than a meta-rule. The majority was on the right track
in holding that they key to the scope of Chevron is whether Congress has delegated authority to an
agency to make rules with the force of law, and the agency has exercised that authority. The next
logical step was to define what it means for an agency to act with “the force of law.” The traditional
understanding is that agency action has such an effect when it is not open to further challenge and it
subjects a person who disobeys to some sanction, disability, or other adverse legal consequence. Fiinal
legislative rules, both substantive and procedural, have this effect, as do final, self-executing
adjudicatory orders. Other types of agency action do not. A reasonably clear meta-rule was thus within
the grasp of the Court. It should have seized it. As we shall see, using a meta-rule to determine the
scope of Chevron deference has a number of desirable consequences that will be diluted or lost under a
meta-standard.
I. IN SEARCH OF THE MEAD DOCTRINE
11

Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2171. See also id. at 2177 (stating that Skidmore rather than Chevron applies when “circumstances
indicate no intent to delegate general authority to make rules with the force of law, or where such authority was not invoked
[by the agency]”).
12

Id. at 2187 (Scalia, J. dissenting).

13

Id. at 2188 n.6 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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Chevron, of course, is the Court’s most important decision about the most important issue in
modern administrative law: the allocation of power between courts and agencies “to say what the law
is.”14 Chevron describes a now-familiar two-step procedure for resolving this issue, asking first whether
Congress has “spoken directly” to the contested issue of interpretation, and if not, whether the agency’s
interpretation is “permissible” or “reasonable.”15 The inquiry seems rule-like because each step is
defined in terms of the examination of a single variable: whether or not Congress has answered the
question (step one), and whether or not the agency interpretation is reasonable (step two).16
As any administrative lawyer can attest, this rule-like appearance is deceptive. Many different
considerations can be brought to bear in determining at step one whether a statute is clear or ambiguous;
an equally wide-range of variables are implicated in asking at step two whether the agency has adopted
an interpretation that is reasonable. Still, as compared to the multi-factoral approach that preceded
Chevron, and that lives on under the mantle of Skidmore, the Chevron doctrine narrows significantly the
range of factors that courts may consult in deciding whether to accept or reject an agency reading of a
statute. In that sense, the Chevron doctrine is, if not a rule, at least more rule-like17 than Skidmore,
which “set forth a sliding scale of deference owed an agency’s interpretation of a statute that is
dependent ‘upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to

14

See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071 (1990) (discussing Chevron as a
“counter-Marbury” for the administrative state).

15

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.

16

“A rule singles out one or few facts and makes it or them conclusive of legal liability; a standard permits consideration of
all or at least most facts that are relevant to the standard’s rationale.” Mindgames, Inc. v. Western Publishing Co., Inc., 218
F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, J.).

17

As others have recognized, rules and standards are not a dichotomy but exist along a continuum. See, e.g., Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 57 (1992)
(noting that rules and standards fall along a “continuum of discretion”).
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persuade, if lacking power to control.’”18
For many years after Chevron, it was unclear whether Chevron had superseded Skidmore, or if
not, when courts should apply Chevron and when they should turn to Skidmore.19 The Court took its
first important step toward resolving these issues just two years ago in Christensen v. Harris County.20
The question was whether an agency interpretation advanced in an opinion letter written by an agency
official, and later endorsed in an amicus curiae brief filed with the Supreme Court, is eligible for
Chevron deference. Five Justices, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that Chevron does not apply in
these circumstances. The majority stated that agency interpretations are eligible for Chevron deference
only if they have been advanced in a decisional format that has the “force of law,” and an opinion letter,
whether or not endorsed in an agency amicus brief, does not have the force of law.21 The Court made no
attempt to explicate what it means for agency action to have the force of law, or how the force of law
criterion links up with the underlying rationale of Chevron.
Christensen elicited two dissents with respect to the scope of Chevron. Justice Scalia argued that
the agency opinion letter was entitled to Chevron deference, because it reflected the “authoritative” view
of the agency.22 Justice Breyer, joined in relevant part by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, opined that the
majority had overstated the distinction between Chevron and Skidmore, and suggested that Chevron
simply identified “an additional, separate legal reason for deferring to certain agency determinations.”23
Sensing that further clarification was needed, the Court almost immediately granted the
18

Mead, 121 S.Ct. 2183 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).

19

See generally Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L. J. 833, 848-852 (2001)
(cataloguing numerous unresolved questions about when Chevron applies).

20

529 U.S. 576 (2000).

21

Id. at 587.

22

Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

23

Id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting)..
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government’s petition for certiorari in United States v. Mead Corp.,24 which presented the question
whether tariff classification rulings issued by the Customs Service are entitled to Chevron deference.
When a ruling finally emerged in Mead, it revealed a new alignment. Eight Justices, including the five
who had joined the Thomas opinion in Christensen plus the three who joined the Breyer dissent, united
behind an opinion by Justice Souter holding that tariff classification rulings are not entitled to Chevron
deference. This time, only Justice Scalia dissented, again asserting his view that any “authoritative”
interpretation should be eligible for Chevron deference.
Tariff classification rulings are letter rulings issued by the Customs Service in response to a
request by an importer for advice as to what tariff applies to a proposed importation of foreign goods.
Such rulings are expressly authorized by statute, which speaks of them as “binding” rulings,25 and the
implementing regulations state that they are “binding on all Custom Service personnel” until modified or
revoked.26 However, this binding effect is limited to the specific import transaction described, and
other importers are cautioned not to rely upon the rulings “in connection with any transaction other than
the one described in the letter.”27 In the typical case, no public notice or opportunity to comment is
provided before tariff classification rulings are rendered, nor is the importer entitled to a hearing beyond
the request for a ruling and the responsive letter, which may or may not include a statement of reasons.28
Tariff classification rulings are extremely numerous; over 10,000 are issued by 46 different Customs
offices every year.29

24

530 U.S. 1202 (May 30, 2000).

25

19 U.S.C. § 1502(a).

26

19 CFR § 177.9 (2000).

27

Id. § 177.9(c).

28

Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2169.

29

Id. at 2174 (citing Brief for Customs and International Trade Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 6).
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Mead is written like a major statement about the nature and scope of the Chevron doctrine, and
in many respects the opinion succeeds in providing some clarification. At the most general level, Mead
eliminates any doubt that Chevron deference is grounded in congressional intent. Throughout the
opinion, the Court refers continually to congressional intent, expectations, contemplations, thoughts, and
objectives.30 The opinion makes clear that the ultimate question in every case is whether Congress
intended the agency, as opposed to the courts, to exercise primary interpretational authority. This should
put to rest speculation that Chevron rests on something other than congressional intent, such as the
doctrine of separation of powers or a judge-made canon of interpretation.31
Mead is also emphatic in reaffirming that the choice is not between Chevron and no deference.
If the triggering conditions for Chevron deference are not satisfied, courts nevertheless may be required
to defer to agency interpretations under Skidmore, which applies when the agency has some special
claim to expertise under the statute but its interpretation is not legally binding. Thus, after Mead we
have three degrees of deference to agency interpretations of statutes: Chevron – a rule-like doctrine that
requires courts to accept reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes; Skidmore – a standard
that requires courts to consider agency interpretations under multiple factors and defer to the
interpretation if it is persuasive; and no deference, which applies when independent judicial review is
required, for example, where the agency action is alleged to violate the Constitution or where statutes
designed to constrain agency discretion like the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are at issue.
Finally, Mead reaffirms and elaborates on Chrestensen’s basic proposition that Chevron applies
only when the agency interpretation has the “force of law.” The Court held that a two-part inquiry

30

See Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2172 (expectations); id. at 2171 n. 11 (intent); id. at 2173 (thoughts); id. at 2175 (objectives); id at
2176 (intent); id at 2177 (intent).
31

For a discussion of different jurisprudential arguments justifying Chevron deference, endorsing congressional intent as the
most plausible, see Merrill and Hickman, supra note 19 at 863-873.
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should be undertaken in determining whether Chevron-style deference is in order:32 The court should
ask, first, whether Congress has delegated to an agency general authority to make rules with the force of
law. If the answer is in the affirmative, the court should then ask whether the agency has rendered its
interpretation in the exercise of that authority. Thus, the key question that must be resolved at the
threshold in determining whether Chevron applies is one of legislative intent: whether Congress
intended to delegate power to the agency to take action having the force of law.
These clarifications are of considerable importance. Still, the decision leaves major
uncertainties. Most notably, Justice Souter did not identify any triggering condition for determining
when an agency has been given the power to act with the force of law. Instead, his opinion proceeds by
discussing a number of factors suggesting that the Customs Service had not been delegated power to act
with the force of law in issuing tariff classification rulings. He declined to identify any of these factors
as being either necessary or sufficient conditions for finding the relevant type of delegation. In other
words, the Souter opinion implicitly treats “force of law” as an undefined standard that invites
consideration of a number of variables of indefinite weight.33
To make matters worse, the Souter opinion is most unclear as to exactly how many factors it
regarded as being relevant. Depending on how one reads the opinion, the Court considered either three,
four or five factors. My reading is that the discussion boils down to three factors: (1) whether Congress
has prescribed relatively formal procedures; (2) whether Congress has authorized the agency to make
32

Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2171; 2177.

33

In a footnote near the end of the opinion, the majority appeared to go even further, suggesting that Chevron’s domain can
only be determined through case-by-case, analogical reasoning:
It is, of course, true that the limit of Chevron deference is not marked by a hard-edged rule. But Chevron
itself is a good example showing when Chevron deference is warranted, while this is a good case showing
when it is not. Judges in other, perhaps harder, cases will make reasoned choices between the two
examples, the way courts have always done.
Id. at 2176 n.18. This suggests that the Court envisioned the choice between Chevron and Skidmore being determined
through a process of pure casuistic reasoning. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 953 (1995)
(explaining and defending casuistic reasoning).

8

rules or precedents that generalize to more than a single case; and (3) whether Congress has authorized
the agency to prescribe legal norms that apply uniformly throughout its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, I
readily admit that the number and correct characterization of the factors invoked in the majority opinion
is open to debate.34
One factor clearly deemed relevant by the majority is whether the statute “provides for a
relatively formal administrative procedure.”35 The majority opinion says that “a very good indicator” of
the requisite intent is “express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”36 The point here will
undoubtedly be the source of confusion. I do not think the Court was saying, as some commentators and
lower courts suggested before Mead,37 that if an agency adopts notice and comment or trial-type hearing
procedures on its own authority, its interpretation is presumptively entitled to Chevron deference.
Rather, the Court seemed to be saying that when Congress commands the use of notice and comment or
trial type procedures, and the agency exercises this authority, then the resulting interpretation
presumptively reflects a delegation of authority by Congress to act with the force of law.
This proposition seems correct as an empirical generalization. Congress will tend to command

34

The case for four factors would be that, in addition to whether Congress has authorized rules or precedents that transcend a
particular case, the Court also considered whether the agency had sought to exercise such authority. See Mead, 121 S.Ct. at
2173-74 (breaking into two paragraphs the discussion of the nature of the congressional delegation and of the Customs
practice). I discount this because the point of the Court consideration of agency practice in the second paragraph seems to be
to confirm its construction of congressional intent. The case for five factors would be that, in addition to the preceding four,
the Court also considered whether Congress has provided for de novo review of the agency action that incorporates the
interpretation. See id. at 2174 & n. 16 (noting in text and accompanying footnote that the Court of International Trade (CIT)
engages in independent review of tariff classification rulings). I discount this because it appears to be inconsistent with
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999), which held that substantive regulations of the Customs are
entitled to Chevron deference notwithstanding de novo review of Customs decisions by the CIT.
35

Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2172.

36

Id.

37

See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore with the Architecture of Chevron, 42 Wm & Mary
L. Rev. 1105 (2001).
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the use of relatively formal procedures only when the action has important consequences, and agency
action that binds with the force of law has important consequences. Thus, commands to use formal
procedures will tend to be positively correlated with actions having the force of law. As Justice Scalia
correctly observed, however, “[t]here is no necessary connection between the formality of the procedure
and the power of the entity administering the procedure to resolve authoritatively questions of law.”38
For example, the APA authorizes agencies to make legislative rules in several contexts without
observing notice-and-comment procedures.39 Thus, the relationship between procedural formality and
the force of law is at most empirical, not analytic.
The majority appeared to acknowledge this point, although it did so in a manner that was itself
empirical rather than analytical. The majority noted that although “the overwhelming number of our
cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication[,]” “the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found
reasons for Chevron deference when no such administrative formality was required and none was
afforded.”40 This, of course, does not explain why an instruction to use formal procedures should – or
should not – be regarded as relevant to whether there has been the right kind of delegation. The Court
appeared to be invoking a kind of stare decisis – the lack of procedural formality cannot be decisive
because in past cases the Court did not treat it as decisive.41 For whatever reason, the Court

38

Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2180 (dissenting opinion).

39

Justice Scalia referenced rules involving grant and benefit programs. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2). The APA also exempts
rules involving “military or foreign affairs functions,” id., and it authorizes agencies to issue binding legislative rules without
notice-and-comment procedures where the agency finds “good cause” to forego these procedures or when the agency adopts
rules of “agency organization, procedure, or practice.” Id. § 553(a)(3) (A) & (B).

40

Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2173. Actually, the Court cited only one such case – NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995). (Justice Scalia cited four others, all decided within six years of Chevron. See
Mead, 121 S.Ct. 2184-85.)

41

This was a feeble argument, since the question whether Chevron applies notwithstanding the absence of any directive to
use formal procedures had merely passed in silence in the handful of cases referenced by the Court. Thus, these were not
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acknowledged that whether Congress has prescribed formal procedures is neither a sufficient nor even a
necessary condition of finding the relevant delegation; it is at most a factor positively correlated with the
likelihood that such a delegation has occurred.
After the convoluted discussion of formal procedures, there ensue two paragraphs even more
obscure in their import.42 My interpretation of these paragraphs is that they boil down to a single second
factor: whether Congress has authorized rulings that have a legal effect that generalizes beyond a single
case. In other words, a delegation to act with legal force will ordinarily authorize rules that bind all
persons who come within their terms or, at the very least, orders that invoke decisional rules that are
then treated as precedents in future controversies.
holdings about the scope of the Chevron doctrine that would require overruling if they could not be accommodated to the
“force of law” test.
42

Lest I be accused of exaggerating, here they are (with citations omitted):
No matter which angle we choose for viewing the Customs ruling letter in this case, it fails to
qualify under Chevron. On the face of the statute, to begin with, the terms of the congressional delegation
give no indication that Congress meant to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with
the force of law. We are not, of course, here making any global statement about Custom’s authority, for it
is true that the general rulemaking power conferred on Customs authorizes some regulations with the force
of law, or ‘legal norms’ as we put it in [United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.]. It is true as well that
Congress had classification rulings in mind when it explicitly authorized, in a parenthetical, the issuance of
‘regulations establishing procedures for the issuance of binding rulings prior to entry of the merchandise
concerned.’ The reference to binding classifications does not, however, bespeak the legislative type of
activity that would naturally bind more than the parties to the ruling, once the goods classified are admitted
into this country. And though the statute’s direction to disseminate ‘information’ necessary to ‘secure’
uniformity seems to assume that a ruling may be precedent in later transactions, precedential value alone
does not add up to Chevron entitlement; interpretative rules may sometimes function as precedents, and
they enjoy no Chevron status as a class. In any event, any precedential claim of a classification ruling is
counterbalanced by the provision for independent review of Customs classifications by the [Court of
International Trade]; the scheme for CIT review includes a provision that treats classification rulings on par
with the Secretary’s rulings on ‘valuation, rate of duty, marking, restricted merchandise, entry
requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs, or similar matters.’ It is hard to imagine a congressional
understanding more at odds with the Chevron regime.
It is difficult, in fact, to see in the agency practice itself any indication that Customs ever set out
with a lawmaking pretense in mind when it undertook to make classifications like these. Customs does not
generally engage in notice-and-comment practice when issuing them, and their treatment by the agency
makes it clear that a letter’s binding character as a ruling stops short of third parties; Customs has regarded
a classification as conclusive only as between itself and the importer to whom it was issued, and even then
only until Customs has given advance notice of intended change. Other importers are in fact warned
against assuming any right of detrimental reliance.

Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2173-74.

11

If this was what the Court was saying, then it is undoubtedly correct. Any interpretation eligible
for judicial deference must invoke some rule of decision – some legal principle or rationale. An
administrative scheme that disclaims any binding effect beyond the party to the ruling – even if it is only
precedential effect – is one that generates no “law” in the relevant sense and hence cannot have the
“force of law.”43
It is unclear whether the majority understood this factor, like the first, to be merely empirical and
predictive of the required type of delegation, or whether it was suggesting some analytical connection
between authority to make decisional rules and the power to act with “the force of law.” At one point
the majority says that “precedential value alone does not add up to Chevron entitlement; interpretative
rules may sometimes function as precedents and they enjoy no Chevron status as a class.”44 This would
seem to negative any claim that authority to articulate a rule of decision is a sufficient condition of
power to act with the force of law. Whether this factor is even a necessary condition, the majority did
not say.
A third factor stressed by the Court is also somewhat cryptic but easier to unpack. The Court
observed that the Customs generates thousands of tariff classifications each year from different ports of
entry, with no systematic effort at coordination. The Court thought it “simply self-refuting” to suggest
that Congress intended such a system to have the force of law.45 The suggestion here seems to be that a
delegation to an agency to act with the force of law will usually generate uniform rules throughout the
agency’s jurisdiction. A regulatory system unconcerned with whether like cases are treated alike is also

43

For discussion of the role of rules in systems of precedent, see Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S.Cal. L.
Rev. 1 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571 (1987).

44

Id. at 2174. The court here cited to Peter Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 Duke L. J. 1463, 1472-73 (1992), which
makes the point that interpretative rules are often treated by agency personnel as having approximately the same force as
agency precedent.
45

Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2175.
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an unlikely candidate for the appellation “law.”
This too seems correct as an empirical generalization. Implicit in the ideal of the rule of law is
the understanding that the same legal rules will be applied to similar transactions wherever the legal
regimes applies. When Congress establishes a regime that is not designed to maintain legal uniformity,
it is implausible to describe the rulings generated by that regime as having the force of law. Once more,
however, the Court did not suggest that uniformity is either a necessary or sufficient condition of finding
the relevant type of delegation. This factor, like the first (and possibly the second), is implicitly treated
as predictive rather than analytical.
Justice Scalia, for his part, would apply Chevron to any agency interpretation that is
“authoritative.”46 By “authoritative,” however, Justice Scalia did not hone in on any single variable, as
would typically be the case with a rule. To the contrary, he mentioned a variety of variables that might
be relevant in determining whether a particular interpretation reflects the “official position of the
agency.” These include whether the interpretation has been endorsed at the “highest level” in the
agency as opposed to by “some underlings;” whether the general counsel has defended the interpretation
in court; whether the interpretation has been supported by a brief filed by the Solicitor General; and
whether the interpretation is more than a “post hoc rationalization” or a legal position developed by the
agency in litigation.47 Thus, “authoritative” is also a type of standard rather than a rule. Justice Scalia
acknowledged at one point that “[t]he authoritativeness of the agency ruling may not be a bright-line
standard.” But, he quickly added, “it is infinitely brighter than the line the Court asks us to draw
today.”48

46

Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2187 (Scalia, J. dissenting).

47

Id. at 2187-88 & n. 6 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

48

Id. at 2188 n. 6 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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The majority and Justice Scalia were engaged in a version of the perennial debate over rules
versus standards. But they were largely talking past one another. Justice Scalia’s sarcasm about “th’ ol’
totality of the circumstances test” was directed at employing Skidmore at the primary decisional level in
cases where the more rule-like Chevron does not apply.49 He devoted relatively little energy to
chastising the majority for adopting a meta-standard for fixing the boundary between Chevron and
Skidmore. 50 The majority opinion, in contrast, was not much interested in defending standards or
attacking rules at the primary level. Rather, the majority was content to have both a rule and a standard
at this level, and was preoccupied with identifying the factors that are relevant at the meta-level in
determining the line of division between the two. As to this meta-question, it is not clear that either side
fully appreciated that the rules versus standards debate was replicating itself once again. In any event, at
this level both the majority and the dissent ultimately opted for a standard rather than a rule.
II. THE CASE FOR A META-RULE
The voluminous literature on rules and standards suggests a number of justifications for rules.51
At least four are relevant to the choice between meta-rules and meta-standards for determining the

49

Most of Justice Scalia’s arguments about the bad consequences of “the Mead doctrine” were directed to the majority’s
countenance of continued use of Skidmore. Thus, he argued that Skidmore was a recipe for “uncertainty, unpredictability,
and endless litigation,” id. at 2183; that the majority’s approach would lead to an artificial increase in rulemaking by agencies
in an effort to escape the uncertainties of Skidmore and gain Chevron deference, id. at 2181; and that Skidmore deference
would lead to “ossification” of statutory law, since agency interpretations upheld under Skidmore, unlike those sustained
under Chevron, cannot be reversed by agencies at some later date. Id. at 2182.
50

Indeed, Justice Scalia appeared at times to understand the majority as advocating something akin to a meta-rule for these
purposes – that Chevron applies when agencies utilize relatively formal procedures but not otherwise. Id. at 2179 (describing
the majority’s “background rule” to be “while there is no single touchstone for [an intent to delegate authority to act with the
force of law] it can generally be found when Congress has authorized the agency to act through (what the Court says is)
relatively formal procedures such as informal rulemaking and formal (and informal?) adjudication, and when the agency in
fact employs such procedures.”).
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proper scope of the Chevron doctrine.52 (1) Rules are better than standards in confining the discretion of
actors at lower levels within a hierarchy, and hence are useful in overcoming principal-agent problems
within complex organizations.53 (2) Rules are better than standards in providing a basis for security of
expectation about the future behavior of the government, and thus they encourage investment and
planning.54 (3) Rules are better than standards in communicating information about legal options, and
hence they facilitate coordination among different government actors.55 (4) Rules are more efficient
than standards, because they conserve on the need to expend resources on legal advice and litigation.56
Each of these justifications links up with a different audience affected by whether the Court
selects a meta-rule or meta-standard for fixing the scope of Chevron: the first applies to the lower courts,
the second to agencies, the third to Congress, and the fourth to nongovernmental entities. I consider
each in turn.57
A. Lower Courts: Confining Discretion
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These are by no means the only or even the most important justifications for rules. They are, however, the ones that I think
are most relevant in considering whether a meta-rule is appropriate for delimiting the scope of the Chevron doctrine.
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I will not consider at any length one possible objection to this inquiry: that the legal rubric for deference has little effect on
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standard like Skidmore. This is particularly likely to be true in the lower courts. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on
Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 1 (1998) (collecting
studies).
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The lower federal courts are obviously a primary audience for any meta-test devised by the
Supreme Court for fixing the boundary between Chevron and Skidmore. The issue here is how important
it is that the Court be able to control the behavior of the lower courts. Rules are generally more
predictable and easier to enforce than standards. Hence they generally are a superior mechanism for
controlling the behavior of subordinate actors within a hierarchy. In the federal judicial system, the
problem of control is greatly exacerbated by the extremely limited number of cases the Supreme Court
can review in any given year.58 If the Court had the capacity to review every court of appeals decision,
then it could indulge in the luxury of engaging in case-by-case reasoning in defining the scope of the
Chevron doctrine. But when the Court has the ability to review only a small percentage of cases,
effective control of the behavior of the lower courts may require that the Court adopt a meta-rule.
The issue of control of lower courts is especially important where part of the objective is to
assure that lower courts follow a rule-like approach, i.e., Chevron, over a significant range of
controversies. Although Christensen and Mead cut back on the scope of the Chevron doctrine, there is
no sign that the Court is less committed to Chevron where it properly applies. If anything, the Court’s
commitment appears to be growing as it comes to see Chevron deference as the only plausible strategy
for preserving uniformity and coherence within complex federal statutory regimes.59 Yet if we adopt a
meta-standard to govern the choice between rule and standard at the primary decisional level, there is
obviously a danger that lower courts will employ this meta-standard to favor the use of the discretionmaximizing primary standard. In other words, using a meta-standard to choose between a rule and
standard creates an opportunity for lower courts to make it standards all the way down.60
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See Peter L. Strauss, One-Hundred-Fifty Cases Per year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1118-29 (1987).
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Currie’s interests analysis (a meta-standard). See Erin Ann O’Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of

16

I do not wish to overstate the danger of lower court discretion here. If lower courts look beyond
the Court’s nebulous meta-standard and heed the holdings of its recent decisions, their discretion clearly
will be constrained to a significant degree. No lower court is going to apply Chevron rather than
Skidmore to an agency interpretation adopted in an opinion letter. And no lower court is going to apply
Skidmore rather than Chevron to an agency interpretation adopted pursuant to an express grant of
substantive rulemaking authority. The area of uncertainty has been narrowed to things like
interpretative regulations adopted after notice-and-comment procedures, and informal adjudications that
are treated like precedents by the agency. Moreover, the problem of lower court discretion in these
intermediate areas is likely to be only temporary. As the Court gradually decides cases in these
intermediate areas, it will eventually transform the meta-standard into something more like a complex
meta-rule, thereby reducing lower court discretion.
Still, if it is generally desirable that lower courts give Chevron deference to agency
interpretations, such a goal will be undermined to a degree if lower courts are given broad discretion
under a meta-standard to decide whether Chevron applies over a range of situations not yet addressed by
the Supreme Court. The risk that lower courts will undermine the systemic benefits of greater deference
to agency interpretations thus provides some basis for preferring a meta-rule over a meta-standard.
B. Agencies: Encouraging Investment
Agencies are also affected by the choice between meta-rule and meta-standard. Here, the
relevant justification for using rules rather than standards is that they make the behavior of those who
wield the coercive power of the state more predictable, and in so doing facilitate planning and encourage
investment. This justification applies to agencies in the following way. Agencies regard Chevron

Contractual Choice of Law, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1151, 1158-60 (2000). One consequence of adopting a meta-standard for
choice of law purposes is that it effectively gives the court that hears the controversy discretion to determine which
substantive law to apply.
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deference as a good thing. Agencies very much want judges – state actors who review their decisions
and have the authority to set them aside – to accept their legal interpretations, so they can more
effectively implement the statutes they have been charged with administering. Yet, it is now clear that
agencies must make a certain investment in administrative processes in order to obtain the Chevron
payoff. In the vocabulary of Christensen and Mead, they must take whatever procedural steps are
necessary to assure that their interpretation has the “force of law.” It is a matter of considerable
importance to agencies that they know in advance what investment they must make before they get the
Chevron payoff. Otherwise, they may end up foregoing opportunities to obtain Chevron deference
because they assume the price is too high, or they may end up losing Chevron deference because they
assume the price is lower than it really is.
To make the problem more concrete, consider two examples. Agencies often face the choice
between making policy by substantive or interpretative rule. Substantive rules entail certain costs that
interpretative rules do not: Substantive rules usually require that the agency engage in cumbersome
notice-and-comment procedures, and once adopted, a substantive rule cannot be retroactively
amended.61 If both substantive and interpretative rules were entitled to Chevron deference, many
agencies would prefer to use interpretative rules to make policy. But if only substantive rules get
Chevron deference, then there is a tradeoff. The agency will have to decide whether obtaining the
higher degree of judicial deference is worth the additional procedural costs associated with substantive
rules.
One can tell a similar story about the choice between formal adjudication and opinion letters.
Formal adjudication requires a greater investment in procedures than opinion letters do, and formal
61

See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979) (“Certainly regulations subject to the APA cannot be afforded the
‘force and effect law’ if not promulgated pursuant to the statutory procedural minimum found in that Act”); Bowen v.
GeorgetownUniv. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216-25 (1988) (Scalia, J. concurring) (arguing that absent express statutory authority
to the contrary the APA prohibits substantive rules with retroactive effect).
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adjudication typically creates a precedent that can be cited in future cases, whereas opinion letters often
do not. So if agencies can get Chevron deference for opinion letters, many agencies would prefer go this
route. If only formal adjudication gets Chevron deference, however, it’s a more difficult call because
the price of such deference is higher.
Adopting a meta-rule to determine the scope of the Chevron doctrine would reduce uncertainty
about what sorts of agency interpretations are eligible for Chevron deference. Agencies would thus find
it easier to predict what sort of payoff they will receive for using different types of procedural formats to
advance interpretations of law. Greater predictability about payoffs should reduce the incidence of overor under-investment in administrative procedures, and should reduce the number of episodes in which
agency initiatives are frustrated by what happens on judicial review. All of this seems desirable, and
provides a second reason to prefer a meta-rule to a meta-standard for defining the ambit of Chevron.
C. Congress: Communicating Information About Legal Options
A third audience affected by the Court’s choice between a meta-rule and a meta-standard is
Congress. Here, we encounter yet another advantage of rules relative to standards: Because they are
relatively predictable, rules send clearer signals than standards about what legal options exist. Better
communication about legal options not only enhances individual reliance interests, it also facilitates
coordination among governmental institutions.62 This is relevant to Congress, because Christensen and
Mead make clear that Congress has the authority to turn Chevron deference on and off; Congress can do
this by either delegating power to an agency to act with the force of law with respect to a particular issue
(Chevron on) or by not delegating such power to the agency (Chevron off). But Congress can exercise
this authority only if it knows what it must say in a statute in order to convey the message that an agency
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See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 26, 66 (1994).
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has been given power to act with the force of law.63 If acting with the force of law is defined by a metarule, then Congress will have a relatively clear signal about what it must do to confer primary
interpretative authority on an agency. Conversely, if acting with the force of law is defined by a blurry
meta-standard, whether Congress has succeeded in designating an agency (or the courts) as the primary
interpreter often cannot be established until after the issue has been litigated. Adopting a meta-rule
therefore serves to preserve and protect the role of Congress that the Court has identified as the very
foundation of the Chevron doctrine.
In this regard, it is important to note that Christensen and Mead represent a significant step
toward revitalizing the principle of legislative supremacy, or if you will, the nondelegation doctrine. By
grounding Chevron in congressional intent to delegate power to make rules with the force of law, the
Court has resuscitated the axiom that Congress is the primary source of authority to make law within our
system of separation of powers. With narrow exceptions, neither the executive nor the courts have
inherent power to act with the force of law.64 They derive such power only pursuant to a valid
delegation from Congress.65 If this principle is worth reaffirming, then presumably it is important that

63

See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (“What is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to
legislate against a background of clear interpretative rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.”). For
recognition of this point in the context of Chevron, see Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative
State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2000); Bernard
W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative Process: Can it be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L.
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Congress and all other actors within the system of separation of powers understand what it takes for
Congress to delegate the power to make rules with the force of law.66
A possible objection to these arguments is that, at least as to the future, Congress should have no
trouble directing whether agencies have authority make interpretations that have the force of law.
Congress simply has to include a statement in the statute that agency rules or orders will or will not have
“the force of law.” (For that matter, Congress could simply specify whether reviewing courts should or
should not apply “the Chevron doctrine.”)
This is true as to new legislation. But it overlooks the problem of what happens under existing
legislation. Congress does not have the time or institutional capacity to review and amend all existing
delegations to agencies to add the appropriate tag line to assure that the desired allocation of
interpretational authority is reached. If the Court adopts a clear meta-rule about what kinds of
delegations will sustain Chevron deference, however, then Congress (and affected agencies and interest
groups) usually can ascertain by examining existing statutes what conclusion courts will reach. In this
way, the relevant parties will be in a position to know which statutes can be left alone, and which should
be targeted for revision.
D. Nongovernmental Entities: Efficiency
Finally, nongovernmental entities subject to the regulatory oversight have an interest in whether
the scope of the Chevron doctrine is defined by a meta-rule or a meta-standard. Because rules are more
predictable than standards, lawyers generally can provide better advice about the probable outcome
under a rule than under a standard.67 Similarly, when issues are drawn into litigation, arguments about
66
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the proper application of a rule will generally require less effort to develop than arguments about the
proper application of a standard. Where meta-issues are concerned, these disparities in the relative
efficiency of rules are standards are multiplied.
Consider a regulated entity that seeks advice from a law firm about whether an agency
interpretation of law is likely to be sustained on judicial review. If it is unclear whether the reviewing
court will apply Chevron or Skidmore, and the choice between the two is governed by a meta-standard,
the advice will have to cover three issues: (a) the probable outcome under Chevron, (b) the probable
outcome under Skidmore, and (c) whether it is more likely that the interpretation will be reviewed under
Chevron or Skidmore. In contrast, if the dividing line between Chevron and Skidmore is marked by a
rule, the legal advice very likely will have to address only point (a) or point (b). In effect, the use of a
meta-rule reduces the issues that must be considered to one-third what would be required under a metastandard.
Similarly, consider a regulated entity that seeks to challenge an administrative interpretation on
judicial review. If it is unclear whether the court will apply Chevron or Skidmore, then each of the three
issues mentioned above – ( a), (b), and (c) – must be briefed by the parties. If the choice is governed by
a rule, chances are the briefs will have to cover only (a) or (b). Thus, determining when Chevron applies
by use of a meta-rule would almost certainly result in efficiency gains, in terms of conserving on the
resources expended by nongovernmental entities on legal advice and litigation.
****
In sum, there is a substantial case, at least in the abstract, for determining the scope of the
Chevron doctrine by means of a meta-rule rather than a meta-standard. The rule-based approach
promises to constrain the discretion of the lower courts, encourages agencies to make the correct
investments in administrative procedures when formulating policy, provides a clear signal that Congress
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can use to allocate interpretational power between agencies and courts, and conserves on expenditures
on legal advice and litigation by regulated entities. This conclusion is consistent with the meta-tests
found in other areas of administrative law, where questions about applicable procedures or standards of
review are often resolved by using relatively bright-line, single-variable rules. Examples include the
question whether formal or informal procedures apply in rulemaking, and whether adjudications are
subject to the substantial evidence standard of review, both of which are resolved by asking whether
Congress has specified that the agency action is to be “on the record.”68
The main vice of rules, as emphasized in the literature on rules and standards, is that they are
almost always either over- or underinclusive with respect to the underlying goals of the legal system.69
In other words, rules will always generate suboptimal results relative to an ideal system that would
costlessly apply a standard that reflects those goals. But, of course, standards are not costless. As
emphasized here, standards generate principal-agent problems, uncertainty costs, communications
difficulties, and increased expenses devoted to legal services. The question then becomes whether there
is any meta-rule that will delineate Chevron’s domain in a way that achieves the cost savings associated
with rules, but without generating excessive problems of over- or underinclusion.
III. WHEN AGENCIES ACT WITH THE FORCE OF LAW
In determining whether there is a satisfactory meta-rule for determining the scope of the Chevron
doctrine, I take it as a given that the basic inquiry is whether Congress has delegated power to an agency
to make rules with the force of law. Christensen and Mead so hold. And Kristin Hickman and I have
spelled out more fully elsewhere why this foundational proposition is consistent with the underlying
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rationale of the Chevron doctrine.70 We can therefore narrow our search by asking whether it is possible
to articulate a satisfactory rule for identifying when Congress has delegated power to act with the force
of law.
A. The Key Variable: Legislated Consequences for Violations of Agency Action
Traditional administrative law readily suggests a candidate for such a rule: An agency acts with
the force of law when it adopts a rule or order that, once final, is no longer open to challenge and
subjects a person who violates the rule or order to the imposition of some sanction, disability, or other
adverse consequence. Administrative- law types will recognize that this is a restatement of the familiar
“legal effects” test for identifying substantive rules. As stated in the leading decision of the D.C.
Circuit:
A properly adopted substantive rule establishes a standard of conduct which has the force
of law. In subsequent administrative proceedings involving a substantive rule, the issues
are whether the adjudicated facts conform to the rule and whether the rule should be
waived or applied in that particular instance. The underlying policy embodied in the rule
is not generally subject to challenge before the agency.71
A parallel understanding exists with respect to adjudications. Agency orders adopted in
adjudications are understood to have the force of law when, once they are final, the order is regarded as
res judicata and is no longer open to challenge on the merits.72 In a subsequent action to enforce such an
order, the only issues are whether the order was violated and if so, what sanction for violation is
appropriate.
These traditional understandings can be adopted as the basis for a meta-rule defining what it
means for an agency to act with the force of law – with one important qualification. The inquiry that is
70
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typically undertaken today in asking whether an agency rule or order has the force of law focuses on
whether the agency intended its action to give rise to sanctions, disabilities or other adverse legal
consequences once it becomes final.73 In effect, courts have assumed that agencies have the power to
act with the force of law, and have asked whether the agency, in its discretion, has exercised this
power.74 In the context of determining the scope of the Chevron doctrine, the threshold inquiry,
following Mead, must be whether Congress has delegated power to the agency to act with the force of
law. In other words, before asking whether the agency intended to act with the force of law, we must
first determine whether, under the agency’s organic legislation, Congress has given the agency power to
make rules or orders that have the force of law. The critical inquiry for these purposes is whether
Congress has provided by statute that persons who violate an agency’s rules or orders will be subject to
the imposition of sanctions, disabilities, or other adverse consequences. In other words, the key
variable under the proposed meta-rule is whether Congress has included a provision in the statute that
prescribes sanctions or other legal consequences for violations of agency action.
To illustrate, consider the contrast between the rulemaking grants in the Securities Act of 1933
and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The Securities Act provides in Section 19(a) that “[t]he
Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter….” 75 This is clearly a grant of authority to
make rules having the force of law, because Section 24 of the Act specifically provides that “[a]ny
person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this subchapter, or the rules or regulations
promulgated by the Commission under the authority thereof,…shall upon conviction be fined not more
73
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than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 76 Section 6(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act provides, in terms very similar to Section 19(a) of the Securities Act, that “[t]he Board
shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by
subchapter II of chapter 5 of the Title 5, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter.” 77 This is not a grant of authority to make rules having the force of law,
however, because the NLRA contains no provision imposing any sanction, disability, or other adverse
legal consequence on persons who violate such regulations.78
Focussing on the presence or absence of congressionally-prescribed legal consequences is more
than just a convenient formalism. It also makes sense as a guide to congressional intent, provided one
adopts a couple fairly plausible assumptions. One assumption is that most members of Congress
understand that agencies act with the force of law when they adopt rules or orders backed by sanctions,
broadly understood to mean civil or criminal penalties, disabilities or other legal consequences. That is
to say, most members of Congress, at least when drafting regulatory statutes, embrace an Austinian or
positivist conception of “law” as rules backed by the coercive power of the state.79 The other
assumption is that most members of Congress believe that agencies can act with the force of law only if
76
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Congress gives them this power, either expressly or by clear implication. In other words, members of
Congress embrace the version of the nondelegation doctrine that denies that agencies have any inherent
power to make law. Put these assumptions together, and it follows that most members of Congress
understand that agencies have been given authority to make rules or orders with the force of law only if
Congress has prescribed some sanction or other legal consequence for the violation of the agency’s rules
or orders.
Historically speaking, there is also surprising support for the proposition that the presence of
legislated sanctions for violations of agency rules has been regarded by Congress as the key variable in
determining whether statutes authorize agencies to act with the force of law. The legislative histories of
a number of important regulatory statutes of the Progressive and the New Deal eras indicate that
Congress regarded the inclusion of sanctions for violations of agency rules as the critical point of
differentiation between grants of substantive and mere interpretative power.80 Commentaries by
attorneys who were actively involved in advising Congress on this issue, and materials assembled by the
Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, also confirm this understanding.81
Whether Congress continues to adhere to this understanding is harder to say, since modern courts have
not focused on the presence of legislated sanctions in determining whether agencies have substantive
rulemaking power.82 But at least during the formative years of the administrative state this was the
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congressional practice, and that practice forms part of the backdrop of understanding reflected in the
APA.
B. Over- and Underinclusion
Like all rules, the proposed meta-rule keyed to whether Congress has prescribed sanctions or
other legal consequences for violations of agency action is both over- and underinclusive, in the sense
that it would identify power to act with the force of law in certain circumstances where it may be
objectionable, and would deny such power in certain circumstances where it may be desirable. The
question, as always, is whether the costs of over and underinclusion are sufficiently great to cause us to
abandon the use of rules (or at least, of this rule), in favor of a standard.
The principal problem of overinclusion is that the proposed meta-rule includes within its sweep
certain kinds of agency action as to which the public has no notice or opportunity to comment before an
interpretation is adopted. Before turning to these instances, it is important to stress that, on the whole,
the proposed meta-rule does a pretty good job of limiting Chevron deference to situations in which some
kind of public notice and input is in fact available. The rule excludes from the realm of Chevron
deference all interpretative rules and policy statements – the most important exemptions from noticeand-comment requirements under Section 553 of the APA. Neither interpretative rules nor policy
statements give rise to sanctions or other adverse legal consequences immediately upon violation; the
agency must bring some independent action to achieve this result, in which the norm reflected in the
interpretative rule or policy statement will be open to challenge.83 In addition, the proposed rule
eliminates from the scope of Chevron all opinion letters, agency manuals, press releases, amicus briefs,
and so forth – all of which lack any legislative sanction for violation and also lack any requirement of
public input before promulgation.
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Still, there are a few instances of agency action that have the force of law under proposed metarule but are exempt from any public notice-and-comment requirement. These include substantive rules
for which good cause exists to omit these requirements, certain types of rules associated with benefit and
grant programs, and procedural rules.84 For one who believes (as I do) that Chevron deference should
generally be confined to circumstances in which there has been some opportunity for public input before
an interpretation is adopted, these exceptions are troubling. On the other hand, it should be noted by
way of mitigation that substantive rules adopted under the good cause exception are usually only be
interim rules, procedural rules will generally be of lesser consequence than substantive rules, and
modern benefit and grant statutes often are implemented by notice-and-comment rulemaking even if not
required by the APA.85
There are two problems of underinclusion. One is that the legislative-sanctions test would
deprive certain agencies of Chevron deference for interpretations contained in rules, because, under this
definition, they would have no authority to promulgate substantive rules. Included most prominently
here are the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Food and Drug Administration (as to rules
promulgated under its general rulemaking authority). Both agencies have grants of rulemaking authority
that make no provision for sanctions or other adverse consequences for rule violations.86 This is a
genuine problem, however, only if one is prepared to reject as irrelevant the intentions of the Congresses
that adopted the organic legislation establishing these agencies. It is quite clear that the Congresses that
enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 and the Food and Drug Act of 1938 did not intend to
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give either agency general substantive rulemaking authority.87 If this state of affairs is deemed to be
inconsistent with contemporary views of appropriate agency authority, then Congress can amend the
statutes to give these agencies substantive rulemaking authority, as it did in the case of the similarlysituated Federal Trade Commission, which also lacked substantive rulemaking authority until it was
conferred by Congress in 1975.88
The other problem is that certain agencies that engage in relatively formal adjudication would be
denied Chevron deference for interpretations rendered in adjudications, because their orders are not selfexecuting. The NLRB, for example, issues cease and desist orders that do not result in any imposition
of sanctions for violations, unless and until a court enters an order enforcing the Board’s order.89 Thus,
it is the court’s order, not the Board’s, that gives rise to the imposition of sanctions for violations. Since
the proposed meta-rule focuses on whether Congress has prescribed some sanction for violation of the
agency’s rule or order, this means NLRB orders would not be entitled to Chevron deference. This
result seems somewhat counterintuitive, since NLRB orders are issued after a relatively formal
adjudicatory process, and the Court has often stressed that the NLRB’s interpretations are entitled to
deference (although it has not expressly held that they are entitled to Chevron deference90). On the
other hand, the fact that Congress declined to give NLRB orders the force of law unless they have been
reviewed and sustained by a court tells us something about whether Congress intended to give the Board
primary interpretational authority.
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Whether these instances of over- and underinclusion are sufficiently troubling to warrant the use
of a standard rather than a rule, or to warrant abandonment of the proposed meta-rule in favor of some
other (possibly more complex) rule, is necessarily a judgment call. My own judgment is that the
advantages of a clear and simple rule are sufficiently great, and the known instances of over- and
underinclusion sufficiently minor, that the proposed rule warrants our allegiance. In other words, I see
no reason why the Court could not have offered a single-variable triggering definition for what it means
for an agency to act with the force of law, consistent with traditional administrative law precepts:
Agencies have been given power to act with the force of law when Congress has prescribed some
sanction or other legal consequence for violations of agency action. In so doing, it could have avoided
the “utter flabbiness” 91 of its list-of-factors approach.
Conclusion
On the whole, “the Mead doctrine” is a sound development. Mead clarifies that Chevron rests on
congressional intent, and correctly concludes from this that Chevron applies only when Congress has
given some signal that the agency, rather than the court, is to be the primary interpreter of statutory
ambiguity. The decision also correctly concludes that the relevant signal of Congress’s intent in this
regard is a delegation of power to act with the force of law. By linking Chevron and congressional
intent, Mead helps achieve a reconciliation between Chevron and the judicial review provisions of the
APA.92 Indeed, by insisting that the agency gets strong deference only when it acts within the scope of
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delegated power to act with the force of law, and not otherwise, Mead goes part way toward restoring an
important aspect of the nondelegation doctrine, which otherwise fared poorly last Term.93
To be sure, the decision comes up short in terms of articulating a meta-rule to guide lower court
in future controversies. Mead says that Chevron applies only when Congress has delegated authority to
an agency to act with the force of law, but it treats “force of law” as (at most) a standard to be applied by
looking to a variety of factors. The Court’s decision to treat “force of law” as a standard rather than a
rule is regrettable. But nothing the Court did or said precludes future decisions that brush away the
fuzziness in Justice Souter’s exposition, leaving us with a clear and defensible meta-rule.
Finally, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s fulminations, Mead secures a bright future for the
Chevron doctrine. It is now clear that Chevron deference is significantly more powerful than ordinary
deference. It is also clear that Chevron applies whenever agencies exercise delegated lawmaking
authority from Congress. With these propositions established, judges are more likely to take Chevron
seriously. This includes the Justices of the Supreme Court. In the past, a number of Justices have
ignored Chevron or applied a watered down version of Chevron.94 In Mead, eight Justices trimmed back
on the scope of Chevron, but gave it a sounder jurisprudential foundation and signaled that it enjoys the
full support of the Court in its new, slimmed-down form. In the long run, this compact but powerful
Chevron doctrine should enhance, rather than retard, the transfer of interpretational power from courts to
agencies.

Scalia’s theory, which rests the duty to defer on a generalized “legal presumption of congressional intent” untethered to any
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